

# **Table of Contents**

**Introduction to the Committee**

**German Legislative Process**

**Parliamentary Groups (*Fraktionen*) and Coalition Dynamics**

**The Role of the Mediation Committee (*Vermittlungsausschuss*)  
between the Bundestag and Bundesrat**

**Chancellor's Question Time (*Regierungsbefragung*)**

**Voting Protocols and the Constructive Vote of No Confidence**

**The Merz Administration and the Cabinet**

**State of the Economy and Domestic Policy Focus**

**Germany's Strategic Role in the European Union and Global  
Arena**

**Key National Problems;**

- a. Economic Competitiveness and the Threat of  
Deindustrialization**
- b. Comprehensive Reform of Migration and Asylum Policy**
- c. The *Energiewende* (Energy Transition) vs. Energy  
Security**
- d. The Digitalization Deficit in Public Administration**
- e. The Urban Housing Crisis and Rent Stabilization**
- f. Defense Procurement and Fulfilling the *Zeitenwende*  
Mandate**
- g. Healthcare System Strain and the Nursing Shortage**
- h. Pension System Reform Amidst Demographic Aging**
- i. Modernization of National Infrastructure and  
Transportation**
- j. Educational Federalism and Standardizing Quality**

**Bill Workshop**

## **Letter from the Secretary General**

Dear Participants,

As the Secretary-General of MedTrain'26, I am deeply honored and delighted to invite you to the first edition of this conference.

MedTrain'26 is a conference driven by the motivation of diplomacy, politics, and academic development. Throughout our preparation process, our primary motivation has been to bring innovation to your past experiences within the MUN community, to allow you to fully experience an academic MUN conference in every aspect, and I am honored to present to you the academic rigor of a MUN conference in its entirety.

By combining the expertise of our academic team with the tireless energy of our organizing team, we are committed to delivering an unforgettable experience. Whether you are a first-time delegate or an experienced one, MedTrain'26 has been designed to offer you the opportunity to learn the dynamics of MUN through its committees, engage in constructive debates, and witness the finest examples of the art of diplomacy.

Thank you for joining us on this unique journey. I look forward to the unforgettable memories we will create together.

With warm regards,

Mustafa Aslan

Secretary General of MedTrain'26

## **Letters from the Co Under Secretary Generals**

Hello everybody, My name is Doruk Sapmaz,

I don't have an idea of the number of conferences I have attended but I believe it is my 39th.

I graduated from Antalya High School this year and am currently studying so as to study at the University of Akdeniz.

My thanks goes to my brother, my best friend and the best Secretary General, Mustafa Aslan for believing in me and the hardworking Director General Sevgi Gürkan for making this eminent conference happen.

I strongly advise you to read the guide that I, my other Under-Secretary General and my brother Baran İnce and our lovely academic assistant Derin Akyürek, who has written most of the guide, have written.

I wish you all a great conference and can't wait to meet you all in person!

Lastly please read the rules of procedure for this committee and don't be afraid to contact us at any minute.

Sincerely,

Doruk Sapmaz

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Greetings everyone,

I am Baran İnce and I will be with you as an Under Secretary General in the process of our committee, Bundestag,

Then I would like to mention couple of names before I move on, firstly I would like to start by thanking to the secretariat, who is Mustafa all alone, for giving me such a chance to make a committee in a conference like MEDTRAIN'26, then I would like to thank to my Co-Under Secretary General Dozlok for making a committee with me and last but not least I would like to thank to my Academic Assistant Derin Akyürek for her hardwork on the study guide and helping us in this process,

Finally I would like to remind that everyone of you has to read this study guide and make your further researches upon it, believe or not you are going to learn and enjoy a lot more than your expectations if you do the thing that I have mentioned,

If you have any questions upon something I will leave my e-mail address and phone number below so you can contact me at any time,

Until the conference take care of yourselves, I wish you good luck,

baranince88@gmail.com

+905522972107

Sincerely,

Co-Under Secretary General

Baran İNCE

## **Letter from the Academic Assistant**

Esteemed Senators and Honourable Participants,

As the Academic assistants of this committee I am more than pleased to welcome you all to one of the most challenging committees -again- please be welcomed to Bundestag. Senate and parliament committees always have a special place in my heart because it is the only committee that makes you a high degree government officer and you have every right to change the law however you like. Firstly I would like to thank my Co Under Secretary Generals for finding me suitable for this position in a conference that has one of the best academic teams.

You will be experiencing a really unique committee and we want to assure you that this committee will be one of the best experiences you will ever have. Throughout these 2 days you will be debating numerous issues, trying to pass the bills that you have worked on. I wish the best of luck for all of you, stay with love.

If you have any questions please reach me via my e-mail [derin.akyurekk@gmail.com](mailto:derin.akyurekk@gmail.com)

Thank you,  
Derin Akyürek

## **Introduction to the Committee**

Germany operates under a complex federal parliamentary republic, where the Bundestag, as the lower house, plays a pivotal role in the legislative process, electing the Federal Chancellor, and overseeing the activities of the federal government. This bicameral legislature also includes the Bundesrat, which represents the 16 federal states and actively participates in national legislative initiatives. The foundational principles of this federal structure are enshrined in Article 20 of the Basic Law, which designates Germany as a democratic and social federal state, emphasizing popular sovereignty, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. This elaborate system balances centralized governance with significant regional autonomy, reflecting a deliberate constitutional design to prevent the over-concentration of power seen in earlier German states. This dual parliamentary structure, with the Bundestag exercising primary legislative authority and the Bundesrat safeguarding regional interests, necessitates extensive inter-institutional deliberation and consensus-building. This intricate interplay between the Bundestag and Bundesrat, particularly in areas like transport policy and constitutional reforms, highlights the challenges and necessities of cooperative federalism in achieving comprehensive policy implementation. This necessitates a detailed examination of the procedural mechanisms through which legislation navigates both chambers, particularly the role of committees in scrutinizing proposed laws. The Bundestag, for instance, largely conducts its substantive legislative work through a robust system of permanent, special, and investigatory committees, which mirror the government's ministerial departments. These committees serve as critical forums for expert testimony, detailed bill amendments, and cross-party negotiations,

thereby shaping legislation before it reaches plenary sessions for final votes. Conversely, the Bundesrat, while also relying on committees, exhibits a distinct operational paradigm where legislative texts are directly transmitted to senatorial committees for review before being forwarded to the plenary assembly, a process influenced by the need for regional government consultation .

## **German Legislative Process**

In Germany, the power to propose a new law—known as the Right of Initiative—is shared by three distinct bodies:

1. The Federal Government (*Bundesregierung*): This is the most common source of legislation. Most bills are drafted by the relevant federal ministries
2. The Bundestag: A bill can be introduced by a "middle of the house" group, which currently requires at least 5% of the members of the Bundestag or an entire parliamentary group (*Fraktion*).
3. The Bundesrat: As the representative body of the sixteen states, the Bundesrat can also propose legislation to the Bundestag.

## **2. Pre-Parliamentary Stage**

When the Federal Government initiates a bill, it does not go directly to the Bundestag. Instead, it must first be submitted to the Bundesrat for an "initial comment." This allows the states to weigh in on the proposal before it even enters the parliamentary debate. The government then responds to this comment, and the entire package (bill, comment, and response) is sent to the Bundestag.

Conversely, if the Bundesrat initiates a bill, it goes to the Federal Government for comment before being passed to the Bundestag. This ensures that the executive and the regional representatives are in constant communication from the earliest stages.

### 3. Readings and Committees

The Bundestag is where the most public and intense debate occurs. Every bill must undergo three "readings":

#### The First Reading

The First Reading is primarily an introductory phase. While high profile bills may involve a general debate on the floor, the main goal is to assign the bill to the appropriate Permanent Committees

#### The Committee Stage

This is arguably the most important part of the process. In Germany, the Bundestag is often described as a "working parliament" rather than just a "debating parliament." Within the committees, experts are called in, stakeholders are consulted, and the bill is scrutinized line by line. The committees often suggest significant amendments.

#### The Second Reading

Once the committee submits its report, the bill returns to the floor of the Bundestag. Here, every single detail and amendment is debated. Members can propose further changes at this stage.

## The Third Reading

The Third Reading is the final vote. There is often a final closing debate where party leaders summarize their positions. If a simple majority (or sometimes an absolute majority) of the Members of the Bundestag (MdBs) vote "Yes," the bill passes to the next stage.

### To be explained Further;

1 Introduction: A bill is introduced when it is distributed to all *Fraktionengroup*) and placed on the Order of the Day (*Tagesordnung*).

2 Explanatory Memorandum: *Handbuch der Rechtsförmlichkeit* states that every bill must be accompanied by a "Statement of Reasons" (*Begründung*) explaining the necessity, costs, and environmental impact of the law.

### FIRST READING (GENERAL DEBATE)

Commencement: The First Reading begins with the reading of the title and the Preamble/Article 1 (Purpose of the Act) by the Sponsor. questionnaire

General Debate: The debate is limited to the political necessity" of the bill. Technical details Articles/Paragraph are not debated here.

Speaking Time: Each *Fraktion* is allotted a total "Speaking Block" (minutes) to be divided among its members.

Filibustering "Order of the Day." The President may set a time limit for the entire debate. A motion to "Close the Speakers List" is used to prevent delay.

Motion to Proceed: At the end of the debate, a motion must be made to move the bill forward. after motion to proceed committee moves on to first deliberation

*Motion: "I move that the House refer this Bill to the Lead Committee for detailed scrutiny."*

## COMMITTEE STAGE (first deliberation/division)

The Lead Committee appoints Rapporteurs from different parties to prepare a "Committee Report". The bill only returns to the floor once the Committee Report is published. The Lead Committee examines what this bill does, why do we need it or not etc. in a formal format.

## SECOND READING

Second Reading: The President or Clerk reads the bill article by article. Members may only speak on the specific Article currently being read. General debate gets declared by the pres. of the Bundestag. it has no allocated time each party block member receives a 10 min. speech time to use their extraordinary behavior. Amendments may be written but they cannot be sent.

## SECOND DIVISION

A vote is taken on each Article individually. Amendments can be sent every bill shall at least receive 1 amendment. An amendment can only be sent after the motion to open the amendments passes.  $\frac{1}{3}$  votes is enough to pass the motion to open amendments

Motion to Open Amendments *Motion: "I move to open the floor for amendments to Article blabla."*

Amendments must be submitted in writing. to the google forms link or via mail

The Sponsor of the amendment has 2 minutes to explain the change; the Bill Sponsor has 1 minute for a rebuttal. After each Article is debated a vote is taken to "Adopt Article blabla as amended/original." Questions can be raised and motion to follow ups are allowed.

## THIRD READING AND FINAL VOTE

Discussion is limited to the changes made during the Second Reading and the overall impact of the final text.

The Final Question: The President shall rise and ask: "Shall the Bill pass?"

Motion for Final Passage:

*Motion:* "I move that the Bill blabla be adopted by the House on its final reading."

## Parliamentary Groups (*Fraaktionen*) and Coalition Dynamics

A parliamentary group, parliamentary caucus or political group is a group consisting of members of different political parties or independent politicians with similar ideologies. Some parliamentary systems allow smaller political parties, who are not numerous enough to form parliamentary groups in their own names, to join with other parties or independent politicians in order to benefit from rights or privileges that are only accorded to formally recognized groups. An electoral alliance, where political parties associate only for elections, is similar to a parliamentary group. A technical group is similar to a parliamentary group but with members of differing ideologies. In contrast, a political faction is a subgroup within a political party and a coalition forms only after elections.

Parliamentary groups may elect a parliamentary leader; such leaders are often important political players. Parliamentary groups in some cases use party discipline to control the votes of their members.

A parliamentary group is typically led by a parliamentary group leader or chairperson, though some parliamentary groups have two or more *co-leaders*. If the parliamentary group is represented in the legislature, the leader is almost always chosen from among the sitting members; if the leader does not yet have a seat in the legislature, a sitting member of the group may be expected to resign to make way for him or her. If the party is not represented in the legislature for the time being, the leader will often be put forward at a general election as the party's candidate for their most winnable seat. In some parties, the leader is elected solely by the members of the parliamentary group; in others, some or all members of the wider party participate in the election. Parliamentary groups often have one or more whips, whose role is to support the leadership by enforcing party discipline.

**Fraktion** is the name given to recognized parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag. In order to form a recognized parliamentary group (*Fraktion*), a lesser group (*Gruppe*) needs at least 5% of the members of the Bundestag. As there is also a 5% election threshold, with parties over this threshold usually getting assigned more than 5% of the seats, almost all groups can nearly automatically declare themselves factions, but due to conflicts, or as a result of below-threshold access granted to regional groups, this is not always the case. Also, even a group has to have at least three members to become recognized as a *Gruppe* and gain more rights than the individuals have. The leadership of each *Fraktion* consists of a parliamentary party leader, several deputy leaders, and an executive committee. The leadership's major responsibilities are to represent the *Fraktion*, enforce party discipline and orchestrate the party's parliamentary activities. The members of each *Fraktion* are distributed among working groups focused on specific policy-related topics such as social policy, economics, and foreign policy. The *Fraktion* meets every Tuesday afternoon in the weeks in which the Bundestag is in session to consider legislation before the Bundestag and formulate the party's position on it.

Parties that do not hold 5% of the Bundestag-seats may be granted the status of a *group* in the Bundestag; this is decided case by case, as the rules of procedure do not state a fixed number of seats for this. This status entails some privileges which are in general less than those of a faction.

An overview of the minimum requirements that must be met in the respective federal state for an association of members of the corresponding state parliament to receive the status of either a recognized parliamentary group (*Fraktion*), or a lesser group (*Gruppe*).

| State Parliament  | Minimum requirements  |
|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Baden-Württemberg | 6 MPs from one party. |

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Bavaria     | Members of a party that obtained at least 5 percent of the total number of votes and at least five seats in the previous state election.  |
| Berlin      | As many MPs from a party or MPs nominated by a party as candidates for election that they correspond to at least 5 percent of the minimum number of members in the House of Representatives (subject to the approval of the House of Representatives, also MPs who do not belong to the same party or are nominated by the same party as candidates have been nominated). It is possible for fewer MPs to form a group.   |
| Brandenburg | 5 MPs from a party, political association or list association or MPs who have been nominated as candidates for election by a party/political association/list association. A parliamentary group can also consist of 4 MPs if their party/political association/list association achieved a total second vote share of at least five percent in the previous state election. (A different composition is also possible subject to the approval of the Landtag) It is possible for at least 3 MPs to form a group. |
| Bremen      | 5 MPs from a party or MPs nominated by a party as candidates for election. (A different composition is also possible subject to the approval of the parliament) The merger of at least 3 MPs into a group is possible.  |
| Hamburg     | So many deputies that they correspond to at least 5 percent of the minimum number of members of the citizenship. Fewer MPs can form a group if the MPs have at least one seat on a committee.   |
| Hesse       | 5 MPs are needed to form a group.   |

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
| Lower Saxony           | Members of a party who, in the previous state election, achieved the proportion of the total number of votes required by the state elections law. (5 percent).   |
| Mecklenburg-Vorpommern | 4 MPs are needed to form a group   |
| North Rhine-Westphalia | The group must have obtained at least 5 percent of the members of the state parliament. (Exceptions can be decided by the state parliament.)   |
| Rhineland-Palatinate   | Members of a party that was elected to the state parliament in the previous election (5 percent of the second votes, ie proportional representation votes, are required for this).   |
| Saarland               | 2 MPs are needed to form a group.  |
| Saxony                 | 7 MPs from a party or MPs who were elected to the state parliament on the basis of party nominations. (The deputies of a party or the deputies who were elected to the Landtag on the basis of a party's nominations may not form several factions.)   |
| Saxony-Anhalt          | 5 MPs from a party or list association or MPs who have been nominated by a party/list association as candidates for election, whereby the party/list association must have achieved the required share of the total number of votes according to the state election law in the previous state election (5 percent). (A different composition is also possible with the approval of the Landtag.) |

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| Schleswig-Holstein | The party must have obtained at least 4 members in the state parliament. (Subject to the approval of the Landtag, members of parliament who do not belong to the same party can also join forces.) However the member(s) of the South Schleswig Voters' Association representing the Danish minority are entitled to the rights of a parliamentary group. |
| Thuringia          | The party or list must have obtained at least 5 percent of the minimum number of members in the state parliament.   |

Following German unification in October 1990, members of the East German parliament joined, resulting in some joint ventures until the 1990 German federal election in December.

*CDU/CSU faction* since September 1949

October 1990 to December 1990 *CDU/CSU/DSU faction*

*SPD faction* since September 1949

*FPD action* September 1949 to October 2013 and since September 2017

*Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group* since October 1994

*Faction The Greens* March 1983 to October 1990

*Faction The Greens/Alliance 90* October 1990 to December 1990

*Group Alliance 90/The Greens*, December 1990 to October 1994

*The Left faction* September 2005 to December 2023 and since February 2025

*The Left group* from February 2024 to February 2025







|      |     |     |     |     |     |    |    |   |    |  |  |  |  |  |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|---|----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2021 | 735 | 152 | 83  | 206 | 118 | 39 | 45 | 1 | 91 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2025 | 630 | 164 | 152 | 120 | 85  | 64 | 44 | 1 |    |  |  |  |  |  |

Throughout the committee we will be focused on;

**CDU/CSU (Union Parties): Represents the conservative, Christian-democratic faction. Following the Feb 2025 election, they remain the largest group.**

**SPD: Represents the social-democratic party**

### **Election system (since 2023)**

After the imperial Reichstag was elected according to a pure first-past-the-post electoral system (with run-off elections) and the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic according to a pure proportional representation system, mixed-member proportional representation, a system combining proportional representation with elements of first-past-the-post voting, has been used for the Bundestag since the founding of the Federal Republic. Before an electoral reform in 2023, the Bundestag nominally had 598 members, with the mixture of majority and proportional representation regularly leading to a large number of additional overhang and compensation mandates. In 2023, this was remedied with a series of modifications that led to

a fixed number of seats of 630 and significantly increased the proportional aspect; after this revised electoral law was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court with some modifications following constitutional complaints, it was applied for the first time in 2025.

Every elector has two votes: a constituency vote (first vote) and a party list vote (second vote). Based solely on the first votes, 299 members are elected in single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post voting. The second votes are used to produce proportionality with respect to the total number of 630 seats; first at the federal level and then at state level (using the Sainte-Laguë method). In most cases, the number of constituencies won by a party in a given state does not exactly correspond to the number of seats to which the party is entitled in that state via second votes. This is balanced in two different ways:

-If a party wins fewer constituencies in a state than it is entitled to based on the second-vote result, the highest-placed candidates from the state list are elected accordingly to the additional seats.

-If a party wins more constituency seats in a state than its second votes would entitle it to, only the corresponding number of constituency winners with the highest percentage of first votes are elected. The remaining constituency winners for that party are not elected.

To qualify for any seats, however, a party must either win three single-member constituencies via first votes (basic mandate clause) or exceed a threshold of 5% of the second votes nationwide. This does not apply to independent constituency candidates: these always enter the Bundestag if they win their constituency. (However, no independent constituency candidate has won a constituency since 1949). Seats allocated in this way are subtracted from the base number of 630 when the mandates are distributed among the parties. In addition, the second votes of voters who have elected a successful independent candidate in a constituency are not taken into account when calculating the number of mandates (although they are for the 5% threshold).

Parties representing recognized national minorities (currently Danes, Frisians, Sorbs, and Romani people) are exempt from both the 5% national threshold and the basic mandate clause. The only party that has been able to benefit from this provision so far at the federal level is the South Schleswig Voters' Association, which represents the minorities of Danes and Frisians in Schleswig-Holstein, and succeeded in winning a seat in 1949, 2021, and 2025.

## **Electoral Term**

The German Bundestag typically operates on a stable four-year cycle, a structure intentionally designed to avoid the political volatility of the Weimar Republic, where frequent snap elections often led to collapse. While early dissolutions are technically restricted to cases where a Chancellor cannot be elected or loses a vote of confidence, leaders have occasionally bypassed these hurdles through the "false vote of confidence"—essentially losing on purpose to trigger an election, a move seen as recently as 2024/25. A core strength

of this system is the principle that there is "no period without parliament"; the outgoing body remains fully functional and empowered until the newly elected members convene for their first session. This ensures legislative continuity and prevents any dangerous power vacuums, even if it occasionally results in a "lame duck" period in the weeks following a vote.

## **Committees**

Most of the legislative work in the Bundestag is the product of standing committees, which exist largely unchanged throughout one legislative period. The number of committees approximates the number of federal ministries, and the titles of each are roughly similar (e.g., defense, agriculture, and labor). There are, as of the current nineteenth Bundestag, 24 standing committees. The distribution of committee chairs and the membership of each committee reflect the relative strength of the various Parliamentary groups in the chamber. In the current nineteenth Bundestag, the CDU/CSU chaired ten committees, the SPD five, the AfD and the FDP three each, The Left and the Greens two each. Members of the opposition party can chair a significant number of standing committees (e.g. the Budget Committee of the Bundestag was by tradition chaired by the biggest opposition party, until the 21st Bundestag, when Alternative for Germany was denied this post). These committees have either a small staff or no staff at all.

## **Legislative calendar**

The Bundestag cannot be adjourned or prorogued during the current legislative term, but is always fully capable of acting and sets its own legislative calendar. Normally, the Bundestag sits for at least twenty weeks per year, interrupted by non-session weeks, especially a long parliamentary summer recess, during which the MPs are present in their constituencies. The course of a session week is traditionally always the same: meetings of the parliamentary faction's internal committees take place on Monday and Tuesday mornings, and meetings in the faction-plenary on Tuesday afternoon. From Wednesday to Friday, plenary sessions and committee meetings take place in parallel (this is the reason why often very few members are present at plenary debates). Committee meetings are interrupted on very important items on the agenda so that all MPs have the opportunity to be present in the plenary hall. The highlights of the procedures include government statements by the Chancellor and the general debate at the beginning of the annual budget deliberations, during which there is a direct clash between the Chancellor and the opposition leader.

Independently of the usual procedure, the Bundestag can also convene for extraordinary sessions at any time. This must happen if one third of the MPs, the President of Germany or the Chancellor request it (Basic Law, Article 39.3).

## **The Role of the Mediation Committee (*Vermittlungsausschuss*) between the Bundestag and Bundesrat**

The Mediation Committee (*Vermittlungsausschuss*) serves as the essential "engine room" of the German legislative process, acting as a vital bridge between the people's representatives in the Bundestag and the state-level interests of the Bundesrat to prevent the kind of gridlock often found in bicameral systems. Composed of 32 members—split evenly between 16 Bundestag representatives and 16 from the state governments—this body functions as a confidential "black box" where politicians can set aside public personas and party rhetoric to engage in pragmatic negotiation. The committee is typically triggered when the Bundesrat disagrees with a bill or when the federal government seeks to save legislation that requires state consent, leading

to sessions where negotiators pursue one of four primary outcomes: passing the bill as-is, scrapping it entirely, proposing specific amendments, or failing to reach an agreement after three attempts. Often relying on the *Paketlösung* or "package deal" to trade concessions across multiple issues, this process has become particularly critical under the current Merz administration (2025–2026) as a means of navigating ideological gaps between federal mandates and state implementation. While critics argue that such secret deliberations undermine democratic transparency, proponents maintain that this forced compromise fosters long-term legislative stability and prevents "pendulum politics," ultimately treating the opposition as a partner in a consensus-driven democracy rather than an enemy to be defeated.

## **Chancellor's Question Time (*Regierungsbefragung*)**

The *Regierungsbefragung*, or the Chancellor's Question Time, represents the most visceral and immediate intersection of executive power and legislative scrutiny within the German parliamentary system. While the German Bundestag is often characterized by its "working parliament" model—where the real heavy lifting occurs in the quiet, technocratic corridors of specialized committees—the Question Time is a rare moment of televised, high-stakes political theater that brings the abstraction of governance into sharp, human focus. Established as a regular fixture of the parliamentary calendar, this mechanism allows Members of the Bundestag (MdBs) to bypass the layers of bureaucracy and confront the Chancellor directly. In its modern iteration, particularly following the landmark reforms of 2018 and the subsequent shifts during the current Merz administration in 2026, the session has evolved from a formalistic report-reading into a dynamic, often adversarial exchange that tests the intellectual agility and political resilience of the nation's leader. It serves as a vital democratic pressure valve, ensuring that the government remains not just legally accountable to the Basic Law, but politically responsive to the representatives of the people.

primarily found in Section 106 of the Standing Orders of the Bundestag (GO-BT). Historically, the Chancellor was a rare sight at the dispatch box for spontaneous questioning, often delegating ministerial duties to subordinates. However, the democratic demand for transparency led to a structural pivot. Today, the session typically begins with a brief report from the Chancellor on the most recent Cabinet meetings—effectively setting the stage by outlining the government's current priorities, whether those involve the 2026 fiscal budget, European security integration, or domestic infrastructure projects. What follows is a 60-minute window of unscripted inquiry. Unlike the British "Prime Minister's Questions" (PMQs), which can often devolve into a cacophony of

jeers and pre-planned "punchlines," the German version maintains a veneer of "half-academic" sobriety.

The modern history of the Chancellor's Question Time is divided into "before" and "after" the 2018 reforms. Prior to this, the "Question Hour" (*Fragestunde*) was often a dry affair, populated by parliamentary state secretaries and dominated by pre-submitted written queries. The 2018 overhaul mandated that the Chancellor appear at least three times a year specifically for this format, though the frequency has increased in practice due to political pressure. This shift was a response to a growing "information gap" between the executive and the legislature. In an era of rapid-fire digital news and complex global crises, the "Berlin Bubble" needed a way to show the public that the Chancellor was not just a distant figurehead making decisions in the Chancellery, but a leader capable of defending those decisions in the crucible of parliament. This visibility is crucial for democratic legitimacy; it transforms the Chancellor from a manager of departments into a participant in the national conversation.

### **Voting Protocols and the Constructive Vote of No Confidence**

The constructive vote of no confidence) is a variation on the motion of no confidence that allows a parliament to withdraw confidence from a head of government only if there is a positive majority for a prospective successor. The principle is intended to ensure governments' stability by making sure that a replacement has enough parliamentary support to govern. The concept was introduced on a national scale in West Germany's 1949 constitution, which remains in force after the German reunification; it has been adopted since the 1970s in other nations like Spain, Hungary, Lesotho, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, Albania, and Belgium.

Under the German Empire (1871–1918), the chancellor was appointed or dismissed exclusively by the emperor, leaving the Reichstag with no formal mechanism of removing the chancellor, and therefore pressuring them. When Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg had drawn the ire of the Reichstag majority over his handling of the Zabern Affair, they passed a vote of censure against

him, but the Emperor wanted him to stay, and the Reichstag had no recourse in the matter. The Weimar National Assembly that wrote the Weimar constitution explicitly inserted a provision that the chancellor needed the confidence of the Reichstag. The constitution also contained a strong Reich president who was authorized to appoint and remove the chancellor. A Weimar Republic chancellor thus needed the support of both the president and the Reichstag and neither needed to present a workable alternative when the chancellor was dismissed. This proved especially problematic after the 1925 German presidential election made Paul von Hindenburg president. He was a strongly conservative monarchist who frequently clashed with and tried to undermine the SPD, the party that held the most seats in the Reichstag from 1919 to 1932. In the less than 14 years of the Republic, there was a succession of 14 Chancellors with 20 governments. All of the transitions under Reich President Friedrich Ebert of the SPD (in office 1919 to 1925) were made collegially with the cooperation of the Reichstag. Under Ebert, however, the emergency provisions of which allowed the Reich president to take emergency measures without the prior consent of the Reichstag, was used 136 times, frequently to deal with political violence and economic emergencies. It was only after 1925 that the use of Article 48 led to the imposition of cabinets dependent on the confidence of the president, Paul von Hindenburg. The instability was helped by and seen as contributing to the rise of the Nazi Party. After the 1930 German Reichstag election there was no longer any workable government majority due to the Communist Party of Germany (then holding on to the social fascism thesis and thus unwilling to form a popular front government) and the Nazi party holding 184 out of 577 seats between them and frequently cooperating on motions to disrupt procedures and hamper the government. After the July 1932 German Reichstag election, the Nazis and Communists combined had 319 out of 605 seats, giving them the power to vote down any motion and dismiss the government through a vote of no confidence without being able (or willing) to propose any constructive measures of their own.

The Free State of Prussia (by far Germany's largest and most populous) had a slightly different constitutional setup which required a *positive* majority in favor of a *new* government to unseat the sitting government. Otto Braun of the Social Democrats served as Prime Minister of Prussia from 1920 until the 1932 Prussian coup d'état with only two interruptions, providing much more democratic stability in Prussia than at the Reich level.

To prevent the type of instability seen on the Reich level during the Weimar Republic and taking a cue from the Prussian model, two provisions were included in the 1949 German constitution, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*). They stipulate that *Bundeskanzler* (Federal Chancellor), as the function is now called, may be removed from office by majority vote of the *Bundestag* ("Federal Diet", the German Federal Parliament) only if a prospective successor also has the support of a majority:

**Article 67.** (1) The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.

(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the election.

**Article 68.** (1) If a motion of a Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag with the majority of its members elects another Federal Chancellor.

(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the vote thereon.

As a result, the failure of a motion of confidence does not automatically force either the resignation of the cabinet or a new election. Rather, the cabinet *may* continue as a minority government if there is not a positive majority for a prospective successor. At the same time, the Bundestag can't be dissolved unless a motion of no confidence has passed; this was meant as a way to prevent the incumbent Chancellor from strategically calling a new election (such as when the party or coalition they belong to is higher in the polls). Indeed, a dissolution is allowed only after the cabinet has formally lost parliamentary support.

This mechanism of triggering early elections was used four times at the federal level, in 1972 after Willy Brandt narrowly survived an attempt to unseat him, in 1983 after Helmut Kohl wished to cement his ascension via constructive vote of no confidence (the FDP had switched from supporting Helmut Schmidt and the SPD to backing Kohl and the CDU/CSU two years after the 1980 German federal election), in 2005 when

Gerhard Schröder wished to obtain a new mandate from the electorate in the face of falling poll numbers, criticism from members of his own party and the loss in the 2005 North Rhine-Westphalia state election (a state his party had governed since 1966) and in 2024 when the FDP broke the coalition with SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens led by Olaf Scholz.

In 2005, president Horst Köhler at first hesitated to grant Schröder's request to dissolve the Bundestag, he ultimately did so and the German Federal Constitutional Court refused to undo Köhler's action as it deemed the issue a political question tacitly endorsing the new convention.

For a motion of no confidence, a majority of all Bundestag members is needed to elect a new chancellor, so not participating in the vote has the same effect as voting *no* (or abstaining). This was of importance in the first, ultimately unsuccessful use of this instrument.

Also, the Federal President may dissolve the legislature *only* after the failure of a motion of confidence, and the legislature may not dissolve itself either. This provision is intended to limit the power of the President. One consequence of this is that in contrast to many other parliamentary democracies, the Chancellor does not petition the President to dissolve the legislature. Rather, a Chancellor needs to (deliberately) lose a motion of confidence in order to force a snap election.

## **The Merz Administration and the Cabinet**

The Merz cabinet is the 25th and current Government of the Federal Republic of Germany during the 21st legislative session of the Bundestag. It succeeded the previous cabinet led by Olaf Scholz. The cabinet is led by Friedrich Merz.

The cabinet is composed of Merz's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister-party Christian Social Union (CSU) (which form the CDU/CSU alliance; the so called *Union*) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). It is the fifth time a governing coalition between Union and SPD has been formed in post-war German history and the first since the Fourth Merkel cabinet led by

then-Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2018.


**Berlin, 6 May 2025 – total votes: 630 – absolute majority: 316<sup>[11]</sup>**

| Ballot  | Candidate               | Votes         |     | Proportion | Parties        |
|---|-------------------------|---------------|-----|------------|----------------|
| 1st Ballot  | Friedrich Merz<br>(CDU) | Yes           | 310 | 49.2%      | CDU/CSU<br>SPD |
|   |                         | No            | 307 | 48.7%      |                |
|   |                         | Abstention    | 3   | 0.48%      |                |
|   |                         | Invalid       | 1   | 0.16%      |                |
|   |                         | not submitted | 9   | 1.43%      |                |
| Friedrich Merz was <b>not</b> elected as Chancellor of Germany. |                         |               |     |            |                |
| 2nd Ballot  | Friedrich Merz<br>(CDU) | Yes           | 325 | 51.6%      | CDU/CSU<br>SPD |
|   |                         | No            | 289 | 45.9%      |                |
|   |                         | Abstention    | 1   | 0.16%      |                |
|   |                         | Invalid       | 3   | 0.48%      |                |
|   |                         | not submitted | 12  | 1.90%      |                |
| Friedrich Merz was <b>elected</b> as Chancellor of Germany.     |                         |               |     |            |                |

## State of the Economy and Domestic Policy Focus

### Economic growth

The economy recorded average annual growth of 1.0% in the decade to 2024. However, in more recent years the economy has been weighed on by rising trade tensions, weak demographics, slow adaptation to emerging technologies, supply restraints and soft global goods demand in the wake of the pandemic. Germany's economy markedly underperformed the G7 average in 2021-23.



## Fiscal policy

Germany's fiscal deficit averaged 0.5% of GDP in the decade to 2023. This fiscal strength allowed Germany to implement substantial fiscal stimulus in response to the COVID-19 pandemic without significantly harming its overall fiscal position. By 2022, Germany's focus was on returning to pre-pandemic fiscal norms, balancing the need for improving competitiveness and boosting defense spending with its longstanding commitment to fiscal stability and debt reduction.




## Unemployment

The unemployment rate averaged 5.8% in the decade to 2024. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany's unemployment rate increased only marginally, thanks to strong social safety nets and job support schemes.



## Inflation

Inflation averaged 2.5% in the decade to 2024. That said, the picture has changed notably since the pandemic: Inflation was well above the European Central Bank's 2% target in 2022 and 2023, due to global supply pressures, a strong bounce-back in economic activity, a rise in protectionism and the reduction of Russian gas flows.



## Monetary Policy

Euro Area monetary policy rate ended 2024 at 3.15%, up from 0.05% a decade earlier. The European Central Bank (ECB) maintained historically low policy rates from 2013 to 2021, reflecting prolonged economic sluggishness and low inflation in the Euro area. By 2022 however, the focus had shifted towards normalizing policy in response to economic recovery and rising inflation, with policy rates hiked to an over decade high.

## Exchange Rate

From end-2014 to end-2024 the euro weakened by 20% vs the U.S. dollar. The euro saw volatility over the last decade in response to changes in global risk sentiment, and relative interest rates in the U.S. vs Europe. That said, the euro has tended to depreciate vs the dollar, likely on higher safe-haven demand and the United States' economic outperformance relative to the Eurozone.

## Germany's Strategic Role in the European Union and Global Arena

Germany has played a significant role in Europe, both in a positive and a negative sense for centuries. Also today, the size of the state, the size of the population, and most of all, its political importance and impressive economic and military potential predestine it to play such a role. Since its beginning in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), remembering the tragic results of two lost world wars, at the same time tending to eliminate, or at least weaken,

the negative associations from the last war in the perception of its neighbours, has made a constructive contribution to building democratic European structures, while maintaining considerable constraint in the international arena. This happened under the conditions of Germany's limited sovereignty, due to the decisions of the victorious superpowers, although, as time went by, the imposed limitations were removed, or, acquired, in fact, a symbolic character. The notion "economic giant, political dwarf" stopped being adequate for Germany's real status a long time ago. Currently, however, Germany is facing a turning point in history again. This state of affairs began in 1990 and it can be compared to the situation in the second half of the 19th century, when Germany became one state again after more than two hundred years of partition. In 1998, Wolfgang Schäuble, then chairman of the CDU parliamentary faction, characterised Germany's situation in the following way: "The years of relative peace have ended. The Federal Republic of Germany was not entirely sovereign, which, not taking into account the partition of the country, was even comfortable. Germany was rich and ensured social stability. Now the situation is completely different. The changes occur rapidly, whereas the Germans would like to cut out coupons, travel around the world and have their peace and quiet. But this is impossible." And in fact Germany suddenly found itself in a completely new situation. In 1945 it was a nation with a "broken neck". Later on, the years of the "economic miracle" imprinted the conviction of its excellent economic condition, however, the still existing vivid memory of the war in Germany and in particular in the environment it created, made Germany shun away from a political, European role. Then, suddenly, its neighbours urge it to play such a role. Among other things, they demand that Germany send troops to Bosnia and play a more active role in Europe and in the UN. Germany has to decide what kind of role in Europe it is interested in, taking into consideration current internal and international conditions.

The role that today's Germany plays in enlarging Europe is a result of German tendencies and ambitions, of expectations that other countries link with the new, re-united Germany, and also of certain fears, expressed more or less openly by Germany's neighbours and partners. This role, synthetically speaking, consists in realising its own interests through taking care of European interests. It is limited, though, to a certain degree, by two extremely important factors: the level of the country's sovereignty and the moral charges against the Third Reich

period that Germany tries to get rid of. However, this is clearly visible in relations with other countries and international institutions. In order to find an appropriate place for itself in a united Europe, Germany for years supported the vision of Western Europe as a union of states and societies without any mutual prejudices, motivated by a desire to cooperate after painful historical experiences

After years of economic prosperity, when the lack of workers necessitated attracting a labour force from other European countries, and after the reunification euphoria, Germany faced problems. These are not troubles that cannot be overcome by a strong German economy but keeping them for a long time, or deepening them, can influence the internal situation of Germany in a negative way. Moreover, there appeared a phenomenon called "being tired of coalition" in Germany. Christian Democrats and Liberals had been governing Germany for sixteen years, they had been in power for twenty-eight years, so they had exhausted the formula of government. They were not able to make a breakthrough in the evolving situation, hence their popularity decreased. But also those who came to take over power, did not have a significantly new program. Therefore, they looked for slogans to attract their voters by populism, using the population's common fears of change. In addition, one problem leads to another. Appearance or continuation of one problem stimulates the appearance of several others. They then make a difficult knot to untie. The future role of Germany in Europe depends, to a large degree, upon its internal situation. There are many factors influencing this situation, also external ones, such as the direction of the future development of the European situation which will have an impact on the internal situation of Germany. Hence, attempting to predict the role that Germany will play in an enlarged Europe, one has to consider the future arrangement of powers on our continent.

## **Key National Problems;**

### **k. Economic Competitiveness and the Threat of Deindustrialization**

Germany is currently facing a structural identity crisis as its long-standing model of "export-led growth" faces unprecedented pressure. For decades, the German economy relied on affordable energy (largely from Russia), a stable global trade environment, and a dominant automotive sector. However, the surge in energy prices following geopolitical shifts, combined with high corporate tax rates and an aging infrastructure, has led to fears of "deindustrialization." Major industrial giants are increasingly looking to move production to the United States or China, where energy costs are lower and digital integration is more advanced. To maintain its status as Europe's powerhouse, Germany must navigate a difficult path of deregulation and tax reform while simultaneously subsidizing the transition to a "green" industrial base. The challenge lies in fostering innovation in high-tech sectors while preventing the collapse of the traditional manufacturing core that provides millions of high-paying jobs and sustains the nation's social security systems.

### **l. Comprehensive Reform of Migration and Asylum Policy**

Migration remains perhaps the most socially and politically sensitive issue in German discourse today. The country faces a paradoxical challenge: while its economy desperately requires skilled labor to combat demographic decline, its social and administrative infrastructure is struggling to keep pace with the influx of asylum seekers and refugees. Municipalities across the 16 states are reporting that they have reached their limits regarding housing, school capacity, and integration services. This has fueled an intense legislative debate over stricter border controls, faster deportation of individuals without a right to stay, and the

transition from cash benefits to payment cards to reduce "pull factors." The federal government must find a way to streamline the asylum process and improve the labor market integration of those already in the country, all while upholding constitutional humanitarian obligations and managing a polarized electorate that is increasingly skeptical of current migration management.

### **m. The *Energiewende* (Energy Transition) vs. Energy Security**

The *Energiewende* is Germany's ambitious project to transition into a carbon-neutral economy by phasing out nuclear power and coal in favor of renewables. However, the timeline for this transition has clashed harshly with the immediate need for energy security. Following the loss of cheap natural gas imports, Germany has had to temporarily rely more on coal and expensive Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals to keep the lights on and the factories running. The national problem is twofold: the physical infrastructure—specifically the massive north-to-south power lines—is not being built fast enough to transport wind energy to industrial hubs, and the cost of electricity remains among the highest in Europe. Senators and legislators are constantly debating how to balance climate targets with the "industrial electricity price" subsidies needed to keep German products competitive on the world stage without bankrupting the federal budget.

#### **n. The Digitalization Deficit in Public Administration**

Germany is often criticized for being a "digital laggard" among developed nations, particularly within its public administration. Despite being a high-tech exporter, many government services still rely heavily on paper-based processes, physical signatures, and snail mail. This "digitalization deficit" creates a significant drag on economic productivity, as businesses and citizens face lengthy bureaucratic delays for simple permits or registrations. The core of the problem is the fragmented nature of German federalism; because the states and federal government use different software systems and have different data privacy interpretations, creating a unified national digital portal is a logistical nightmare. Modernizing this system is no longer just about convenience; it is a national necessity to ensure that Germany remains an attractive place for international investment and that the state can function efficiently in an increasingly paperless global economy.

#### **o. The Urban Housing Crisis and Rent Stabilization**

In Germany's major metropolitan areas, the dream of affordable housing has become a nightmare for the middle and working classes. Cities like Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich are facing a severe supply-demand imbalance, driven by urbanization and a persistent failure to meet federal construction targets of 400,000 new apartments per year. High interest rates, skyrocketing material costs, and complex building regulations have caused many private developers to freeze new projects. Consequently, rents have soared, leading to a heated debate over "rent caps" (*Mietpreisbremse*) and the potential expropriation of large landlords. The national government is under pressure to simplify building codes and provide massive subsidies for social housing, while simultaneously ensuring that new buildings meet strict environmental standards. This tension

between "green building" and "affordable building" remains a central point of legislative friction.

#### **p. Defense Procurement and Fulfilling the *Zeitenwende* Mandate**

Since the 2022 announcement of the *Zeitenwende* (historic turning point), Germany has committed 100 billion euros to a special fund to modernize the Bundeswehr (Armed Forces). However, throwing money at the problem has revealed deep-seated structural issues within the defense procurement system. Decades of underfunding have left the military with "hand-me-down" equipment and a bureaucratic apparatus that takes years to approve even basic purchases. Germany is under immense international pressure, particularly from NATO allies, to consistently meet the 2% GDP spending target and to become the "backbone" of European conventional defense. The challenge for legislators is to reform the procurement laws to allow for faster acquisitions while ensuring transparency and managing the long-term fiscal impact as the special 100-billion-euro fund eventually runs dry.

#### **q. Healthcare System Strain and the Nursing Shortage**

The German healthcare system, once considered the gold standard of Europe, is under significant strain. An aging population is placing higher demands on medical services, while the system faces a critical shortage of qualified nursing staff and general practitioners, particularly in rural regions. This "nursing crisis" is driven by a combination of high-stress working conditions, stagnant wages, and an aging workforce within the medical profession itself. Furthermore, many hospitals are facing bankruptcy due to a financing model that prioritizes volume over quality. The federal government is currently pushing for a massive "Hospital Reform" to centralize specialized care in larger hubs, but this is meeting fierce resistance from state governments who fear their local populations will lose access to basic medical facilities. Balancing fiscal

sustainability with the constitutional right to equal living conditions—including healthcare—is a primary national struggle.

#### **r. Pension System Reform Amidst Demographic Aging**

Germany is facing a "demographic time bomb" that threatens the stability of its statutory pension system. The system operates on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, where current workers fund the pensions of current retirees. As the "baby boomer" generation enters retirement and the birth rate remains low, there are fewer workers to support a growing number of pensioners who are living longer than ever before. To keep the system from collapsing, the federal government already has to inject over 100 billion euros of tax revenue annually into the pension fund. Proposed solutions, such as raising the retirement age to 69 or 70, increasing contribution rates, or investing part of the pension fund in the stock market (*Aktienrente*), are all politically explosive. Finding a way to ensure "generational fairness" without impoverishing the elderly or overburdening the young is one of the most difficult legislative tasks of the decade.

#### **s. Modernization of National Infrastructure and Transportation**

Germany's reputation for world-class infrastructure is fading as its bridges, roads, and railways show signs of severe neglect. The *Deutsche Bahn* (national railway) has become a symbol of this decline, with chronic delays and cancellations caused by a crumbling network and outdated signaling technology. Decades of prioritizing balanced budgets (*Schwarze Null*) have led to a massive "investment backlog." Modernizing this infrastructure is critical not only for climate goals as the government wants to shift freight from road to rail but also for economic survival. However, infrastructure projects in Germany often take decades to complete due to endless legal challenges and complex environmental impact studies. Legislators are now debating "acceleration laws" to bypass some

of this red tape, but they must do so without trampling on the democratic rights of local citizens and environmental protections.

#### **t. Educational Federalism and Standardizing Quality**

In Germany, education is the sovereign responsibility of the 16 federal states (*Kulturhoheit*), which has led to a highly fragmented system where a high school diploma from one state might not be seen as equivalent to one from another. This "educational federalism" is increasingly viewed as a barrier to social mobility and national competitiveness. Recent international studies (like PISA) have shown a decline in German students' performance in mathematics and reading, and the gap between students from wealthy and poor backgrounds is widening. There is a desperate need for a national digital education offensive and a solution to the massive teacher shortage. However, any attempt by the federal government to set national standards or provide direct funding is often blocked by the states, who guard their educational autonomy fiercely.

## **Bill Worksop**

### **Title**

“A Bill For An Act Relating To Income Tax” ... The “bill for an act” phrase means that if the bill passes the Legislature and becomes law, it becomes an “act” of law and receives an “act number.”

### **Sections**

Bills are divided into sections. The first section may be a purpose section, which states the purpose of the bill and may describe the situation or problem that gives rise to the measure or describe the need for and intent of the legislation. Sections may specify the action mandated by the legislation, including clear instructions for changes to the Hawaii Revised Statutes, our State’s codified law. They may also provide definitions of terms, provide remedies and penalties, and specify how long the legislation will be in effect. Some bills will contain a “severability clause,” which instructs the court that if one section of the act is found unconstitutional, the remainder of the act will remain intact, or a “savings clause,” which states that the bill is not retroactive.

SECTION 3. Statutory  
material to be repealed  
is bracketed and  
stricken. New  
statutory material is  
underscored.

## **Second to the Last Section**

If the bill provides for changes in statutory or constitutional material, the second to the last section typically will be the Ramseyer provision. This section explains that in the previous sections of the bill, all statutory material that is to be added is underscoped, and all statutory material that is to be repealed is bracketed and stricken [~~like this~~].

SECTION 4. This Act  
shall take effect  
on July 1, 2019.

## **Last Section**

The last section of the bill will provide the effective date – i.e., the date the law will take effect. This may be a specific date or may read, “This Act shall take effect upon its approval.” In some cases, more than one effective date may be provided – for example, the act will take effect on one date, provided that section 3 will take effect on another date. (Sometimes during session, bills are amended to have far-in-the-future effective dates, such as 2050. While not invalid if enacted, such “defective dates” are inserted to ensure further discussion. Typically, such changes ensure the bill will have to go to conference committee if successful.)

## **An Act to**

\_\_\_\_\_ **(The summary of your bill goes here)(Preamble)**

SEC. 1. 4 Short Title: Your bill will have an official title, but this is where you put the title you 5 actually want your bill to be called (i.e. JOBS Act, PATRIOT Act, etc.)

SEC. 2. 7 (a) Explanation of terminology- Which terms need to be defined in order to understand the bill?

(b) Not all terms will need to be defined. In fact, you may not need to define any terms.

SEC. 3. 11 What is the act going to do? Who is going to be involved / impacted / affected by the act?

SEC. 4. How is the act going to be funded? Who is going to enforce / administer this act? (Which government agencies will oversee the bill and its duties?).

SEC. 5. Penalties (if any) for non-compliance (not following the rules) of the act

SEC. 6. 18 Enactment Date: When will the law go into effect?

**SAMPLE BILL**

**An Act to**

Preamble,

Protect the constitutional Right to access abortion services, ensure reproductive freedom and safeguard the first amendment rights of the United States citizens by legalizing abortion.

Main Sponsor: Patty Murray

Co-Sponsors (Not necessary) :.....

SECTION 1: This act can shortly be referred as the “SAFE” Act ( Securing Abortion and Freedom by Enforcement)

SECTION 2: Any individual or group that engages in violent behaviour, hate speech and hostile actions against individuals advocating for abortion rights and women who are seeking abortion shall be subject to legal penalties, including fines or imprisonment, as determined appropriate by the judiciary.

SECTION 3: Having an abortion shall be left under the woman’s decision. Abortion can be made by pills up to 9 weeks into pregnancy and can be made by surgical assistance up to 27 weeks of pregnancy. Any abortion after the 27th week of pregnancy shall not be allowed unless there are any health threats present.

SECTION 4: A minor seeking an abortion shall be required to obtain consent from a parent or legal guardian. However, in cases where obtaining such consent poses a risk to the minor’s mental or physical well-being, or where the minor believes they may face harm due to ideological or personal differences, the minor shall have the right to request a psychological consultation with a licensed mental health professional. If, after consultation,

the professional determines that involving the guardian may negatively impact the minor's health, the case will proceed by a judicial bypass process, allowing the minor to have legal abortion with court approval.

SECTION 5: Licenced, confidential counseling shall be made available at no cost to individuals considering or recovering from abortion. Participation shall be voluntarily intended to support mental and physical well being.

SECTION 6: All high schools shall provide mandatory, comprehensive sex education. The curriculum shall include instruction on, consent, and unwanted pregnancy prevention.

SECTION 7: The right of individuals to access and utilize condoms, birth control pills, and other FDA-approved contraceptive methods shall be fully protected under federal law. No individual, organization, or authority may restrict or deny access to these resources. Educational and healthcare institutions shall be motivated to provide affordable access to these sources while still keeping the patient's privacy.

SECTION 8: A department shall be established under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to focus and work on this topic and an amount of \$3 000 000 (three million United States Dollars) shall be provided by the Department of Health and Human Services to fund this department. The new established department shall be called "ASD(Abortion Seeking Department)". And this bill shall be funded by this newly established department.

SECTION 9: This bill will be enacted 91 days after its passage.

## ***SAMPLE AMENDMENT,***

***Main Sponsor : Pete Aguilar***

***Co sponsors: Patty Murray, Jon Ossoff***

An amendment to the 4th section of the bill to change the word “minor” to “anyone under the legal age which is 18”.

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22. <https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/germany/>

